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From Boom to Bust: Hardship, Mobilization & Russia’s Social Contract 
 
Samuel A. Greene 
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samuel.greene@kcl.ac.uk 
 
 
 
How and why loyal Russian citizens – and loyal Russian citizens, by most counts, make 
up more than 80 percent of the adult population – come to find themselves on the 
barricades is something of a puzzle. Since surviving a major protest wave in 2011-12, 
Putin has reconsolidated power and legitimacy, supported by a more adversarial 
approach to politics at home and abroad. His approval ratings have remained high, even 
as the economy has collapsed beneath his feet. To many observers, the question is not 
why there are pockets of opposition and protest, but why there aren’t more. In truth, 
these are the same question: the same shifts in politics that consolidated a super-majority 
of voters behind Putin has laid the groundwork for a much more contentious – and 
much more pervasive – kind of politics.  
 
The boom years of Vladimir Putin’s first three terms in office gave observers of Russia a 
sense of a set of social contracts: one with the elite (centered around rents), one with the 
broad mass of the population (centered around paternalistic ‘non-interference’), and one 
with the urban upper class (centered around the provision of space for ‘individual 
modernization’).1 As living standards improved steadily over the course of nearly a 
decade and a half – providing, for the first time in post-Soviet history, a certain stability 
of expectations – a series of mobilizational interactions between the state and various 
challengers served as border skirmishes, outlining the contours of these settlements, 
illustrating how far each side could push (and be pushed) before something would 
break. Thus, a series of benefits protests and labor strikes in the mid-2000s seemed to 
set the terms of engagement between the state and most of its citizens, while more subtle 
standoffs with the economic elite and the most mobile urbanites led to similar 
understandings of the balance of power in society.2  
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The end of the boom provides an important opportunity to revisit received wisdom. 
Whereas the dislocation of the 1990s followed what had been many years of steady 
institutional decline, the current downturn – which is in its third year of economic 
contraction, bringing steep declines in GDP, income and consumption – is the first in 
most Russians’ living memory to follow a prolonged period of hardening positive 
expectations. To economic hardship are added a range of other shocks, including 
ideology, elite hierarchy, political coercion and international isolation. 
 
In the post-boom and post-Crimea period, the primary public reaction to the apparent 
failure of the social contract is through a renewal of what in the 1990s was described as 
“involution” – a retreat from the public space and from universal institutions into 
relatively more robust networks of localized inter-personal relationships.3 But even as 
expectations of the state, which were already low, fell still further, the regime itself 
reengineered its own legitimacy, through an appeal based largely on emotion. For most 
of the population in most circumstances, this has been sufficient to produce consent. In 
other cases, however, recourse to the public sphere persists, as citizens faced with severe 
or potentially irreversible threats to their welfare and quality of life engage, as they 
always have, in protest. Unlike prior mobilization cycles, however, post-boom and post-
Crimea mobilization more quickly becomes ideological, driven first and foremost by the 
increasingly rigid and predictable tropes of the state’s own responses.  
 
Looking to the future (a thankless but necessary task) is one of the goals here. The 
underlying trends – a state that increasingly seeks to engage its citizens emotionally and 
ideologically, and a population that feels increasingly alienated from the state materially 
– seem both unlikely to change and bound, over time, to produce ever more and ever 
sharper conflict. The ability of the current regime to withstand these challenges, while 
beyond the scope of this discussion, does not appear to be seriously in doubt. The 
intuition of this essay, however, is that real change in Russia will come not because 
	 3	
power changes hands at the top, but because citizens at the bottom begin to regain their 
faith in the political community’s ability to deliver public goods. 
 
** 
 
Russia’s economy contracted by 3.7 percent in 2015 and, at the time this went to press, 
was set to fall by a further 0.8 percent in 2016.4 Hit by the combination of sanctions, 
falling oil prices and a collapsing ruble, the economy has seen consumption decline by as 
much as 10 percent year-on-year – 2 to 3 percentage points faster than incomes have 
declined – as the government, too, has cut back on social spending.5  
 
Observers have noted a dramatic shift in the government’s approach to this crisis, 
compared to previous shocks. Whereas the Kremlin dug deep into its reserves – and put 
significant on enterprise owners – to minimize the impact of the short-lived 2008-9 
recession, much more of the impact of this deeper and more prolonged downturn has 
been placed squarely on the shoulders of citizens, in the form not only of falling incomes 
and rising prices, but also austerity, which has hit education, healthcare, pensions and 
state salaries.6 
 
Meanwhile, as noted earlier, consumption has fallen faster than income, as Russians 
themselves have striven to get ahead of the crisis.7 Spending has shifted from 
aspirational purchases – homes and cars, purchases that reflect plans and hopes for the 
future – to daily needs; mortgages and automobile loans have fallen by as much as half.8 
All the same, many have compensated by increased consumer borrowing, even as banks 
have made borrowing more expensive.9 The result has been an increasingly difficult – 
and often violent – relationship between borrowers and lenders, into which the 
government has been loath to insert itself.10 Similar friction has emerged between 
workers and employers, to a degree not seen since the rampant salary non-payment 
problems of the 1990s.11 One result is that more than half of working Russians are, in 
one way or another, not able to enjoy the rights and protections afforded to them by 
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Russian labor, tax and pension law.12 Simultaneously, while 61 percent of Russians 
believe that now is a time to save rather than to spend, only 38 percent are prepared to 
trust their savings to banks.13 Not only does this leave savers without the protection of 
Russia’s deposit insurance system: it has also left the Russian Central Bank fretting that, 
as households withdraw from the formal financial sector, monetary policy itself risks 
becoming irrelevant.14 
 
Russians, of course, are aware of all of this. The Levada Center, which conducts regular 
opinion polls independently of government finance, recorded precipitous drops in 
several key indices beginning in 2014: the “family index” (which measures sentiment 
about household economic prospects), the “Russia index” (which measures sentiment 
about economic prospects for society at large), and the “expectation index” (which 
measures sentiment about the future). At the same time, the “power index” (which 
measures sentiment about the country’s political leadership) remained high. (See Figure 
1.) 
 
Insert Figure 1 here. 
 
This reflects a structure of public sentiment about power and the economy that cuts 
somewhat against the grain of conventional wisdom about authoritarian social contracts. 
When authoritarian leaders are popular – as Putin genuinely appears to be, or as Hugo 
Chavez was in Venezuela – it is often attributed to a broad public sense that the leader 
governs in the public interest, either through macro-social redistribution or through 
more targeted but nonetheless pervasive clientelism. Putin, however, is seen by his 
citizens to do neither. Since the Levada Center began asking the question in 2006, the 
overwhelming majority of respondents have consistently believed that inequality in the 
country has gotten worse under Putin, not better. (See Table 1.) With similar 
consistency, fewer than a quarter of Russians believe that Putin governs in the interests 
of the middle class, and many fewer still believe he governs on behalf of the citizenry as 
a whole; instead, Russians are much more likely to believe that Putin represents the 
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interests of the ‘siloviki’ in the coercive apparatus, the oligarchs, the bureaucrats and big 
business. (See Table 2.) 
 
Insert Tables 1-2 here. 
 
And yet Russians are not particularly inclined to blame Putin for these or other failings. 
The number of respondents to a Levada poll in March 2015 – three months after the 
ruble lost more than half of its value – who had favorable opinions of Putin’s handling of 
the economy was only two percentage points lower than in October 2009 (41 percent, 
versus 43 percent); approval of Putin’s economic management was higher in both 
periods than in November 2006, when the economy as actually doing better. Nor does 
Putin get much credit for his foreign policy successes. Again in March 2015, a year after 
Putin engineered the highly popular annexation of Crimea, approval of his foreign 
policy stood at 69 percent, only barely above the 66 percent rating he received in 
October 2009. (See Table 3.) 
 
Insert Table 3 here. 
 
Indeed, a closer analysis of the Levada indices suggests that, evidence of pocketbook 
voting notwithstanding, the relationship between economic sentiment and political 
approval is anything but straightforward. As shown in Table 4, the ‘family index’ 
(again, measuring pocketbook economic sentiment) does not correlate with the ‘power 
index’ (measuring approval of Putin and the government broadly). The ‘Russia index’ 
(measuring sociotropic economic sentiment) correlates very strongly with political 
approval, as does the forward-looking ‘expectation index’. And when the indices are 
combined, the family index becomes significantly correlated with the power index – but 
negatively. In other words, sociotropic sentiment translates into regime approval most 
strongly when Russians are particularly unhappy about their personal situation, and vice 
versa: when Russians are feeling personally positive, they seem to have less need of their 
leadership. 
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Insert Table 4 here. 
 
This, in turn, comports with the observations of Russian sociologists, who have noted 
across a range of studies both an increasing reliance on inter-personal ties – often highly 
localized, but increasingly augmented with the help of online social networking 
platforms – and an increased sense of welfare among those who report having the most 
inter-personal ties. Thus, Ekaterina Shul’man writes, “People who feel part of a social 
network believe that they can do without the state – they have an increased subjective 
sense of wellbeing not because they are well led, but because they become more self-
confident.”15 So, too, have individuals consolidated their own lives. According to 
Russian economic sociologists, what Lev Gudkov has called the “inertia of passive 
adaptation”16 seems to be giving way to a more proactive self-reliance: 
Self-reliant Russians today are not a peripheral social group, 
not a marginal class, but a significant and growing group, 
reflecting the dominant trend towards independence and 
activism in society. The portion of Russians who claim 
responsibility for what happens in their lives and are 
confident in their ability to provide for themselves and their 
family without needing support from the state was 44% of the 
population in 2015, up from 24% in 2011.17  
 
This is not, however, an entirely positive phenomenon, in the sense of increased 
autonomy, individualism and self-reliance (traits that, in truth, were all central to 
Russians’ robust coping mechanisms in the late Soviet period and throughout the 
1990s). Disengagement from the formal state has a darker side; to wit, while some 75 
percent of Russians report that their rights have been infringed in one way or another in 
recent years, only 39 percent reported that they appealed to state institutions, including 
law enforcement and elected officials, for help; fewer than 1 percent turned to the media 
or civic organizations, and fully 40 percent sought no help at all.18 Perhaps for that 
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reason as well, Russians by and large chose to ignore the September 2016 parliamentary 
elections, allowing the ruling United Russia party to achieve its largest ever majority on 
the back of the lowest turnout in Russia’s post-Soviet history.19 
 
** 
 
By 2012, as Putin’s personal appeal seemed to be waning (even as the economy was 
doing relatively well), support for Putin was boosted by his close association with bigger 
things – love of country and culture, for example – that most Russians hold dear.20 In 
the wake of the 2011-12 anti-regime protest wave, and in the face of an economy that 
was failing to provide the kind of generalized growth in welfare that had accompanied 
Putin’s first decade in office, the Kremlin opted for a new approach to public politics, 
one that was overtly confrontational, dividing society into more rigid categories of ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ with the help of values-oriented wedge issues, such as religion, sexuality and, 
to a lesser extent, ethnicity.21 To this was added fear, generated by an aggressive public 
sphere – to which the Kremlin’s acolytes are eager contributors – and an increasing 
threat (and sometimes fact) of violence.22 Later, pride entered the mix, as the return of 
Crimea and Putin’s steadfast position in the face of Western pressure (and sanctions) 
produced a ‘rally around the flag’ effect that has lasted until this writing.23 The resulting 
concoction of identity politics, fear and patriotic mobilization – what Kirill Rogov has 
called “the Crimea syndrome” – had, by the summer of 2016, become an inalienable 
part of Russia’s politics.24 
 
The result looked to many Russian observers like a rewriting of the implicit social 
contract(s) of the 2000s. “By the spring of 2014,” Boris Grozovskii wrote, “in	return	for	loyalty	the	state	offered	not	growing	welfare,	but	the	feeling	of	inclusion	in	a	power	that	was	rising	from	its	knees.	This	is	a	very	powerful	emotion,	and	in	return	the	state	now	demands	from	the	population	no	only	loyalty,	but	also	a	preparedness	to	sacrifice.”25	Having	given	up	the	right	to	a	real	political	franchise,	Maksim	
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Trudoliubov	wrote,	society	acquired	not	permanent	prosperity,	but	only	a	loan	of	wellbeing	from	the	state:	“Now,	the	state	is	calling	in	the	debt.”	26 
 
That this shifting bargain would be outwardly welcomed by many citizens, meanwhile, 
is in keeping with previous patterns of pro-state mobilization, wrote the sociologist Lev 
Gudkov: “ 
The	events	of	2014-15	are	not	the	first	time	we	have	seen	mass	
demonstrations	of	solidarity	with	the	authorities.	…		A	state	of	
collective	enthusiasm	and	unfettered	national	self-
aggrandizement	is	generally	preceded	by	a	phase	of	mass	
disorientation,	frustration,	irritation	and,	sometimes,	intense	
fear.	The	waves	we	observe	in	public	sentiment	are	society’s	
reactions	to	rapid	change	in	the	institutional	structure	of	the	
state.	27 
 
But the regime was not the only part of the Russian political landscape that was 
consolidating. For one thing, the challenge of Bolotnaia was overcome, but not 
eliminated. Even as the Kremlin has provided a new, charismatic and traditionalist basis 
for its legitimacy – successfully rallying the majority of Russian citizens to its cause – 
studies of online and offline activity suggest that the 2011-12 ‘Bolotnaia’ movement has 
continued to grow both in numerical and ideological terms, incorporating the anti-war 
movement that emerged in 2014, those aggrieved by the murder of Boris Nemtsov in 
2015, and a growing number of others drawn in by the activism of their friends.28  
 
And, indeed, Russia has seen rapid growth in labor unrest, with a record number of 
work disruptions in 2015, according to the Center for Social and Labor Rights. (See 
Figure 2.) There are “clear signs of workers reacting to worsening economic 
conditions,” particularly wage arrears, which make up the plurality – if not majority – of 
strikes and other labor disruptions, according to labor sociologists Stephen Crowley and 
Irina Olimpieva.29 Labor mobilization is concentrated in regional centers and major 
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cities and is focused on industry and transportation.30 Rising, too, is the proportion of 
labor mobilizations that involve strikes or other stop-actions, from 39 percent prior to 
2014, to 42 percent in 2016.	31 Stop	actions	are	predominantly	provoked	either	by	non-payment	of	salaries	or	by	other	changes	to	remuneration;	other	grievances	–	such	as	generally	low	salaries,	rising	costs	of	living,	poor	working	conditions	and	so	on	–	did	not	generally	provoke	work	stoppages	in	2016.32		
These trends mirror the findings of longer-term, more broad-based research into labor 
mobilization and economic protest in Russia.33 Similar results are provided by an 
analysis of events catalogued by the activism website Activatica.org, demonstrating 
both an increase in overall levels of activity, and an increase in the proportion of activity 
involving political and economic grievances (though environmental concerns 
predominate). (See Figure 3.) 
 
Insert Figure 2 here. 
 
Insert Figure 3 here. 
 
Insofar as our ability to observe is sufficient, the general mechanism by which grievance 
is transformed into mobilization in Russia has not changed: as they were throughout the 
first 12 years of Putin’s rule, Russian citizens remain capable of mounting meaningful 
resistance when the state presents a coherent challenge to their welfare. As before, 
Russians are more likely to mobilize collectively when the threats they face are 
immediate and potentially irreversible, and when the consequences of inaction are faced 
by an identifiable group of people at the same time and in the same way.34 To see how 
things may have changed, however, we need to turn briefly to a closer examination of 
some indicative cases. 
 
** 
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Muscovites are jealous of their green spaces. In a city clogged with traffic and seemingly 
growing more crowded by the day, residents can usually be counted on to protest when 
developers set their sights on their courtyards, playgrounds and parks. Most of these 
protests are local and small, and the majority don’t last very long.35 But some do.  
 
On 18 June 2015, workers cordoned off a section of the Torfianka park in northeast 
Moscow; within a week, locals had begun protesting what turned out to be plans by the 
city administration and the Russian Orthodox Church to build a church in a corner of 
the park, part of a major effort by the ROC to build dozens of new churches across the 
capital. The pro-Kremlin camp wasted no time in reacting. On June 25th – the day of 
the first organized protest against the church – the website Ridus.ru, closely associated 
with the anti-Maidan movement and the pro-Kremlin ‘National Liberation Movement’, 
posted a long and detailed report, concluding as follows: 
Against the construction of the church are arrayed a not 
disinterested group (village idiots and sincere neighbors 
attend, of course, for free) consisting of several social groups: 
leftists, [members of the Yabloko opposition party], Satanists-
anarchists, people who hate the ROC on principle, and free 
citizens who have been brainwashed… 
It’s a courtyard Maidan in action, and none of the 
participants have anything in common with sincerity.36  
 
That, of course, set the terms of the debate to come. By the 9th of July, rallies were 
drawing hundreds and then thousands of participants. Protest leader Natal’ia Kutlunina 
led off the proceedings, calling the park something of a second home for locals, a place 
where they could “go in their slippers and dressing gowns”; a city councilwoman from 
the ruling United Russia party was booed off the stage.37 As the summer wore on, 
protests grew in number and frequency, centered around a permanent camp blocking 
the entrance to the construction site, where the original locals were joined by left-wing 
groups and members of the liberal opposition, as well as residents from other 
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neighborhoods facing similar encroachment. The left-wing blogger Maksim Serov put 
the fight in terms familiar to veterans of the Bolotnaia movement and the opposition’s 
confrontation with the ‘patriotic’ anti-Maidan and the National Liberation Movement: 
“It’s them or us! The residents of our city, or the fascist obscurantists!”38 
 
And so the frame was set. As both sides dug in, many protesters evidently came to see 
their cause as bigger than the park, somehow bound up in the broader effort of some to 
block what the opposition called a creeping clericalization of Russian life and politics. In 
this, they were aided by the language that the Church’s supporters used and the 
associations they formed: A page was launched on the Russian social networking site 
VKontakte in support of the construction of the Torfianka church, combining religious 
symbolism with pictures of soldiers and references to patriotism, while the National 
Liberation Movement called the protests a threat to Russian sovereignty.39 As the 
conflict dragged on into 2016, it was picked up on by the ‘Russian Spring’ movement 
that had supported the Russian mobilization in and around eastern Ukraine, calling for 
their own rally at Torfianka and making the message even starker: 
For us one thing in the situation with Torfianka is obvious: 
‘our’ Moscow church-fighters and the Kiev Euromaidaners 
are one and the same. The same faces, the same methods, the 
same approaches, the same grantmakers …. They are 
preparing and training with an eye on a ‘Moscow maidan’ in 
2016.40  
 
A remarkably similar dynamic took hold in a very different protest movement, 
organized by a network of independent truck drivers from around the country.  
Trucks carry about 5.4 billion tons of goods per year in Russia, far outstripping any 
other mode of transportation for shipments of things other than natural resources. They 
do so, however, on roads that are both notoriously poor and notoriously expensive, the 
precise reasons for which do not need to be explored here. To help cover the cost, the 
Russian government decided to charge the owners of all trucks in excess of 12 tons a tax 
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of 3.73 rubles per kilometer hauled.41 That was bad enough, particularly for the private 
truckers who account for roughly half of the sector. The big logistics companies had the 
bargaining power to pass the cost on to their clients (mostly retailers and distributors), 
who would then pass it on to consumers. But the privateers were under pressure to 
swallow the costs in order to compete. 
 
Hearing the rumblings of protest, the government made an initial concession, reducing 
the rate to 1.53 rubles per kilometer for a few months – and then indefinitely – and 
putting a moratorium on fines. But for the protesters, the problem wasn’t just the 
amount: it was the principle – and the fact that the principle beneficiary looked to be a 
company called RTITS, which won the concession to collect the tax and pocket half of 
the proceeds, and was owned by Igor Rotenberg, the son of Arkady Rotenberg, a close 
friend and associate of Putin. One popular protest placard featured the number 3.73 
with a line through it; another said “The Rotenbergs are worse than ISIS.”42  
 
But the government was not budging. The strike began on 21 November 2015, initially 
in Dagestan; from there and elsewhere, columns of truckers began moving towards St. 
Petersburg and Moscow.43 The same day, Evgenii Fedorov, a member of the Duma and 
leader of the Kremlin-backed National Liberation Movement, broadcast an address to 
the truckers, which began as follows: 
We can see, you and I, that the United States of America is not 
sleeping. And now, through their ‘fifth column’, through 
national traitors, they have landed yet another blow against 
the Russian Federation. Specifically I am talking about the 
actions of the long-distance truckers, who are trying, on the 
orders of the United States of America, to liquidate Russian 
statehood.44  
 
Four days later, opposition leader Aleksei Naval’nyi posted his own video message to 
the truckers on YouTube and on the website of his Anti-Corruption Foundation. With 
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somewhat less emotion and hyperbole than Fedorov had mustered, Naval’nyi argued 
that the heart of the matter was corruption, and thus that the truckers and his activists – 
whatever other political differences they might have – should be able to find some 
common cause.45 
 
As the columns of truckers drew closer to Moscow, one of them – a 27-year-old trucker 
named Vladimir Georgievich from Leningradskaia oblast’ – told his story to Colta, a 
high-brow news and opinion website popular with the oppositional intelligentsia. It 
wasn’t politics that brought us out, he seemed to say: it was community. 
The truckers – we’re not about politics. What’s that worth to 
an average worker? The average worker needs to work, to get 
his salary and feed his family. And that’s all he needs. But if 
they really start to go after us, are we just supposed to look on? 
I mean, here, we’ll give you some money for something that 
doesn’t exist and never will. There won’t be any roads. How 
many times have they lied to us: they promised to end the 
transport tax, and they didn’t. It’s the same with this system – 
they lied once, lied twice. They probably thought it would all 
go down quietly.46  
 
But if the Kremlin failed to predict the truckers’ reaction, so, too, did the truckers fail to 
foresee the turn the government would take. As columns of trucks converged on 
Moscow, more and more messages flooded television and the Internet accusing them of 
ties to Naval’nyi, Washington and the Euromaidan. And, indeed, there was a kernel of 
truth: one of the protest coordinators was Sergei Guliaev, a St. Petersburg activist who 
had been prominent in that city’s contribution to the 2011-12 election protests.47 On 
December 3rd, when the truckers closed ranks outside Moscow and held their ‘snail day’ 
protest, driving ever-so-slowly around the beltway, Putin gave his annual Address to 
the Federal Assembly; the truckers didn’t rate a mention. In an interview on the 
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independent television station Dozhd, one of the truckers’ representatives, Nadezhda 
Kurazhkovskaia, said: 
You know, our expectations were not met. The president 
didn’t meet our expectations. We expected more from him. We 
thought, after all, that he would stand with his people, but it 
didn’t happen. We will fight to the last man, as they say.48 
 
The reaction from ordinary Muscovites, however, was warmer. Perhaps already 
accustomed to snail’s-pace traffic, drivers took to social media – and, in particular, to 
the traffic monitoring and navigation apps that allow drivers to post messages about road 
conditions – to express their support and solidarity; “Nationalize the palaces of the 
Rotenbergs” was a common refrain.49 
 
** 
 
When Putin departs the scene, the palaces of the Rotenbergs – at least those that are in 
Russia – could well be nationalized; at the very least, it would not be historically 
unprecedented in the universe of authoritarian transitions for a successor regime, 
whether democratically elected or otherwise, to target the cronies of its predecessor. But 
would either of those facts – Putin’s departure, and the disenfranchisement of his elite – 
change anything? 
 
From the standpoint of socio-political mobilization, Putin’s departure, when it happens, 
will be important. Mobilizational frames consist, first and foremost, of an injustice to be 
righted and a target who can be blamed for its persistence. The departure of a dictator 
will open up new political opportunities for movement organizations to seek direct 
political leverage, relieving the pressure for street-level activism. Putin’s departure will 
also send activists out in search of new targets to blame: once problems begin to persist 
in to the reign of his successor, blaming Putin will cease to be a viable mobilizational 
strategy. 
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The hardening of politics in Putin’s third term – the deepening of dichotomies, the 
sharpening of political and ideational dividing lines, the increasing role of fear and 
coercion – has contributed to the consolidation both of the regime and its opponents. 
This was, of course, an inevitable result: civil society, as citizens’ mobilized response to 
the state’s intrusions into their private and public lives, reflects the contours of the state 
and thus consolidates to the extent that its primarily interlocutor makes itself tangible. 
Putin’s state-led mobilization has brought new constituents from what had been the soft 
center of Russian politics more firmly into his camp, effectively preventing them from 
falling into opposition; but others have been pushed in the opposite direction. This is not 
an entirely new phenomenon, but it has gathered such force and velocity as to allow us 
to claim that Russian politics today are fundamentally different from what they were 
before. 
 
When Putin goes, the regime, for a time, will become less tangible. The expectations 
that have crystallized over the last few years will shatter, as actors on all sides begin to 
form new sets of roles and understandings. The dividing lines will blur again, and 
Russians on both sides of today’s politics will move back towards the middle. It is, thus, 
hard to overestimate the impact that Putin’s departure will have on Russian civil 
society: it will radically reshape the landscape. 
 
But in other ways, Putin’s departure will change very little. The underlying tectonics of 
Russians’ relationship with their state – their preparedness to see it as simultaneously 
dysfunctional and yet legitimate, unjust and yet worthy – does not change just because 
Putin leaves. It is noteworthy that none of the mobilizational efforts described in the 
pages above – nor, indeed, any of the mobilizational efforts described in any of the other 
studies of Russia cited here – could reasonably be called proactive. In fairness, most 
mobilization is reactive, not least because most people live most of their lives in the 
private realm, venturing into the public only when provoked. But the absence of 
proactive public mobilization is not everywhere so nearly absolute as it is in Russia. 
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Civil-social mobilization in Russia can, in fact, be powerful: it resists the state, pushes 
back against it, delays or stops its advances, sometimes wins a reversal, all the while 
galvanizing communities of interest and ideology. The question is, can civil society 
become convinced that the state itself can change? 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Levada Indices 
 
Source: Levada Center 
 
Table 1: During Vladimir Putin’s rule, has the gap between rich and poor in our country 
increased, reduced or remained the same as it was under Boris Yeltsin? (% of responses) 
 March 
2006 
March 
2007 
March 
2008 
July 
2009 
July 
2010 
May 
2011 
May 
2013 
Sept. 
2014 
Sept. 
2015 
Increased 64 65 53 48 67 73 68 68 69 
Reduced 11 9 13 15 11 10 9 11 9 
Remained 
the same 
21 22 27 31 18 15 16 17 19 
Hard to 
say 
4 4 7 6 4 3 7 4 3 
Source: Levada Center 
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Table 2: In your view, whose interests does Vladimir Putin represent? (% of responses) 
 Oct. 
2000 
July 
2001 
July 
2003 
July 
2005 
Sept. 
2006 
Aug. 
2007 
Oct. 
2010 
July 
2011 
July 
2011 
July 
2013 
Aug. 
2014 
Aug. 
2015 
‘Siloviki’ 54 43 51 51 24 39 34 33 43 41 39 42 
Oligarchs 24 15 27 25 23 18 26 29 39 35 30 31 
Bureaucrats 12 15 21 26 21 19 24 22 32 30 24 28 
Big Business 16 16 21 23 12 13 18 22 26 23 19 24 
Middle Class 10 16 19 23 24 31 27 25 21 24 22 23 
Everyone 5 7 7 6 10 12 8 12 11 12 14 16 
Simple 
People 
13 15 15 18 18 24 20 19 14 11 13 14 
Cultural & 
Scientific 
Elite 
4 8 9 11 7 10 10 9 10 9 10 13 
Yeltsin 
“Family” 
25 22 25 20 13 13 11 13 14 14 9 13 
Intelligentsia 5 10 9 12 7 10 10 10 7 8 9 7 
Hard to Say 13 18 11 12 12 13 14 12 7 10 15 10 
Source: Levada Center 
 
Table 3: In your view, how well is Vladimir Putin handling…? (% of responses) 
 …the economy …foreign policy 
 Nov. 
2006 
Oct. 2009 March 
2015 
Nov. 
2006 
Oct. 2009 March 
2015 
1 (worst) 5 4 7 4 2 2 
2 12 12 15 5 5 6 
3 40 36 34 21 22 18 
4 29 31 30 39 41 37 
5 (best) 8 12 11 25 25 32 
Hard to 
say 
5 5 3 7 7 4 
Source: Levada Center 
 
Table 4: Levada Indices (Dependent Variable: Power Index, standardized beta 
coefficients, standard errors in parentheses) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Family Index .119 
(.177) 
-.252* 
(.193) 
 -.513** 
(.103) 
-.589** 
(.106) 
Expectation 
Index 
 .617** 
(.179) 
  .204** 
(.101) 
Russia Index   .781** 
(.074) 
1.082** 
(.068) 
1.000** 
(.071) 
R-square .014 .257 .610 .784 .806 
* significant at 0.05 level 
** significant at 0.005 level 
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Figure 2: Labor Disruptions per Year 
 
Source: Center for Social and Labor Rights 
 
Figure 3: Composition of Mobilization over Time 
 
Source: www.activatica.org 
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